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ADMIRALTY

--

PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED UNDER THE JONES ACT

On May 7, 1965, a collision occurred between the Norwegian
Topdalsfjord, of the Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, and the
American Steamship Cedarville, owned by the United States Steel
Corporation, as a result of which the Cedarville sank with the
loss of ten of-her crew. The respective owners of the two ships
filed petitions in the federal district court requesting exoneration from or limitation of liability against the administratrices of the estates of three Cedarville seamen who lost their
lives in the collision, and against many of the surviving crew,
who were potential claimants. The representatives of a deceased
crewmember, proceeding under the Jones Act, 1 counterclaimed for
punitive damages against the master and owner of the Cedarville.
Finding that the master of the Cedarville had exhibited wilful
and wanton misconduct toward his crew 2 and that United States
Steel Corporation had ratified that misconduct, 3 the court held,
judgment on the counterclaim, awarding punitive damages. Upon a
showing of wilful and wanton misconduct, a plaintiff suing under
the Jones Act may recover punitive damages. Petition of Den
Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Suppo

163

(NOD. Ohio 1967).

Until the decision in the principal case, punitive damages
had not achieved general judicial recognition or approval by
admiralty courts in tort cases. In 1859, a federal district
court had allowed the imposition of exemplary damages against
the master of a ship for deporting a citizen with full knowledge of the illegality of the deportation proceedings. 4 In
addition, some admiralty courts, while not actually allowing
punitive awards, had suggested in dicta that the imposition of
punitive damages would be justified against tortfeasors for
146 UoSoCo § 688

(1964).

2 The

master had held all crewmembers to their stations in a
futile attempt to beach the Cedarville following the collision.
The court found that the presence of the men was not necessary to
the beaching operation, that there was no evidence suggesting
the operation could succeed, and that the men could have been
safely removed to a nearby ship.
The court found that United States Steel Corporation
ratified the misconduct of the master by refusing to halt the
attempt to beach the Cedarville while in contact with the vessel
by ship-to-shore phone immediately following the collision, with
full knowledge
of the impossibility of the beaching operation.
4
Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 Fed, Caso 1091,

aff'd, 30 Fed, Cas, 781 (1859).

(N.D. Cal.),

5

wilful and malicious acts.
By 1903, however, admiralty law afforded seamen no remedy whatsoever for injuries sustained through
the negligence of master or owner, although crewmembers were entitled to indemnity for injuries occasioned by the unseaworthiness
of the vessel. 6 In 1920, for the purpose of providing seamen with
more adequate remedies, Congress passed the Jones Act, under
which the claimants in the instant case were proceeding. The
act incorporated the provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),7 and provided that seamen could recover damages
for injuries incurred in the course of their employment and
caused by the negligence of master, owner, or fellow crewmen.8
The Jones Act, however, did not specifically provide for recovery
of exemplary damages, and, prior to the decision in Den Norske,
no admiralty court had indicated that claimants under the Jones
Act were entitled to a recovery of punitive damages. In fact, a
long series of cases had indicated that recovery for wrongful
death under the FELA and the Jones Act was based on pecuniary loss
to dependants of the deceased, with recovery limited to the
pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might reasonably have
received had deceased not died from his injuries. 9 An additional
recovery was available 1for
the decedent's conscious pain and
0
suffering before death.
The court in the principal case recognized that punitive
damages had not achieved general approval in admiralty courts,
but reasoned that "in the absence of a specific rule to the
contrary, there is no basis in law or reason for proscribing
the recovery of punitive damages in admiralty. 11
The court
indicated that the failure of the Jones Act and the FELA specifically to provide a punitive recovery did not operate to bar that
remedy under the general provisions of the acts, since exemplary
damages were not the product of legislation, but of common law. 1 2
5 The

Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818); Ralston v. The State
Rights, 20 Fed. Cas. 201, 209-210, (D. Pa. 1836).
6 The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
745 UoSoCo §§ 51-60 (1964).
846 U.S.C. 688 (1964).
9 See, e. . Petition of Southern Steamship Co., 135 F. Supp.
358 (D. Del. 1955); Frabutt v. New York, Chicago, and St. Louis
R. Co., 84 F. Suppo 460, 466 (D. Pa. 1949); Jensen v. Elgin,
Joliet1 &-Eastern R. Co., 182 N.Eo 2d 211, 24 Ill. 2d 383 (1962).
0
id o
1 3Petition of Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp.
163, 174 (NOD. Ohio 1967).

121d. at 176.

The court cited with approval Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Vaughan v, Atkinson, 369 UoSo 527, 540 (1961), to the
effect that a seaman should be entitled to exemplary damages, as
a traditional right under maritime law, in the event a shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance stemmed from wanton and
intentional disregard of the seaman's rights. 1 3 The instant
court reasoned that the Jones Act could be interpreted as authorizing a punitive recovery since language of general import
in other federal acts, e.g. the Civil Rights Act, 1 4 has been so
interpreted, 1 5 and since at least one case had indicated punitive
damages could be granted under the provisions of the FEIA. 1 6 The
court concluded that, under the provisions of the Jones Act, the
imposition of punitive damages against the master and owner of a
ship in favor of representatives of a deceased crewman was
justified.
The decision in the principal case is the latest of a trend
in recent admiralty decisions expanding remedies for seamen injured in the course of their employment. For example, the Supreme
Court, in construing the Jones Act, has indicated that the shipowner has an extremely high duty of care toward the crewmembers
17
aboard his vessel--"an obligation of fostering protection'1
In addition, the judicially devcoped ru. allowing Jones
,18
Act claimants "permissible inferences from unexplained events,
which is the admiralty equivalent of res ipsa loquitur, and
recognition by admiralty courts that seamen are "the wards of
admiraltyp" 1 9 have encouraged recoveries for seamen suing under
the Jones Act for injuries caused by the negligence of master,
owner, or fellow servant, In addition to the Jones Act, the
seaman's traditional remedy of maintenance and cure, which assures
the injured or disabled seaman reimbursement for medical expenses,
a per diem allowance for living expenses, and a recovery of
1 3Den

Norske, id. at 173, 174. It should be noted, however,
that a number of admiralty courts had indicated, in cases not
within the provisions of the Jones Act, that damages in admiralty
were awarded under the principle of restitutio in integrum, and
designed not to punish the tortfeasor, but to return the injured
party to his condition before the injury. The West Arrow, 80
F. 2d 853 (2d Cir, 1936); Lekas and Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris,
306 F. 2d 426 (2d Ciro 1962).
1442 U.S.Co § 1983 (1964).
15 See Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965).
1 E6nnis v. Yazoo and M. V. R. Co., 118 Miss. 509, 79 So. 73
1 91 8bCortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1932).
*1 8 johnson v. United States, 333 U.S0 46 (1948).
1 9 Cortes v.'
Baltimore Insular Line, supra note 17 at 374-75.

unearned wages, regardless of the fault of the master or owner in
causing the injury or disability, has been undergoing recent
Similarly, the seaman's remedy
expansion by admiralty courts. 02
for injuries occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the vessel has
also been the subject of recent admiralty court expansion, 2 1 and
the courts have long held that a shipowner's duty to furnish a
seaworthy ship is absolute, and is not governed by principles of
22
negligence.
Vollowing the decision in Den Norske, there is almost no
limit to the liability of shipowners for injuries incurred by
seamen in the course of their employment and caused by the
negligence of master, owner, or fellow crewman. The decision
represents the current admiralty policy of expansion of remedies
available to seamen, and the decision is a critical one to the
American marine industry, which is suffering from dwindling
profits, rising labor and transportation costs, and renewed
foreign competition. Furthermore, because of certAin concepts
inherent in admiralty, @..o the doctrine that shipowners owe
a duty of fostering protection to seamen), and the decision in
Den Norske may result in future punitive awards against masters
and owners under the Jones Act on proof of conduct somewhat less
serious than the wilful and wanton misconduct justifying punitive
recoveries in common law tort actions.
P. B. S.

2 0 G.

21Ido,
2 2 The

Gilmore & C. Black, Admiralty 254, 257-59
at 252-53.

Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175

(1903).

(1957).

SUBPOENA OF DOCUMENTS LOCATED IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS WHERE
COMPLIANCE SUBJECTS WITNESS TO CIVIL OR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
IN FOREIGN STATE
First National City Bank of New York was served with a
subpoena duces tecum in connection with a federal grand jury
investigation of alleged violations of antitrust laws by
several of its customers. The subpoena required the production
of documents located in the bank's offices in New York and
Frankfurt, Germany relating to transactions in the names of
the customers under investigation. The bank refused to produce
those documents kept at its Frankfurt branch on grounds that
compliance would subject the bank to civil liability and economic
loss in Germany. The government contended that the bank could
be excused from compliance with the order only upon a showing
that compliance would result in criminal liability under German
law. The federal district court adjudged the bank and a bank
officer in civil contempt, finding that the bank would not have
been subject to a criminal penalty under German law, that it
had not acted in good faith, and that there appeared to be a
valid defense to any subsequent suit for damages in Germany. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held, affirmed. A state having jurisdiction to enforce
a rule of law is not precluded from exercising that jurisdiction
solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to civil liability under the law of another
state having jurisdiction over that conduct. United States v.
First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
Prior cases are in agreement that it is improper to order
a witness I to produce documents located in another country where
production would place the witness in eopardy of criminal liability under the laws of that country.
In First National City
3
Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, a bank moved to modify a subpoena requiring production of records located at its branch in
1A distinction must be made between parties and witnesses who
are not parties. When ordering parties to obey a subpoena, the
court can punish noncompliance by dismissal, default judgment, or
by permitting the drawing of adverse inferences. See Societe
International v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). When ordering nonparties to produce evidence located in a foreign jurisdiction, a
court must rely almost exclusively on its contempt powers for
enforcement.
2 Note,
Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdiction
Where Law of Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 295, 300
(1962)7 Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel
Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUMo L. REV. 1441, 1461 (1963).
'271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).

Panama, contending that production would violate Panamanian law.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the subpoena should not be modified because it had not been shown that
compliance would involve a violation of Panamanian law. The
court suggested that in such circumstances a party "should
surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received
therefrom," or, alternatively, be willing to accept the consequences. 4 The court added by way of dicta, however, that if pro5
duction would violate Panamanian law, it should not be ordered.
In Ings v. Ferguson, the district court quashed a subpoena directed
to three foreign banks with New York branches to the extent that
it required the production of documents in Cuba on the basis of
an uncontroverted affidavit of an expert on Cuban law that disclosure would violate Cuban law and might subject officers and
employees.of the bank's Cuban branch to criminal penalties. On
appeal, the Second Circuit quashed the subpoena with respect to
records located in Canada because the foreign banks were witnesses,
not parties to the action, and the court felt that whether removal
of records from Canada was prohibited was a question of Canadian
law best resolved by Canadian courts. Referring to its dicta in
First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, the court
stated that it was improper to "take such action as may cause a
violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least,
an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures,"'7 and suggested
that the party seeking production utilize the procedures provided
by Canadian law. The Second Circuit again faced the problem of
conflicting foreign law in Ap]plication of Chase Manhattan Bank, 8
There the bank contended that a recently enacted Panamanian
statute prohibited production of records located in Panama. After
finding that production would result in a violation of Panamanian
law "equivalent to a misdemeanor" under United States law, the
court shifted the duty to proceed by appropriate process within
Panama to the party seeking production. 9 The subpoena remained
in force, however, to encourage the bank to cooperate with the
production efforts. No other domestic cases have involved a
witness who contended that compliance with a court order should
not be required because of potential civil liability and economic
reprisals in another country. The Supreme Court, however, encountered similar arguments in a case where, incident to a tax
4 Id.

at 620.
51d. at 619.
62-2 F.2d 149 (2d Ciro 1960), modifying Matter of Equitable
Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S. D. N. Y. 1960).
7 Id. at 152.
8j9 7 Fo2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
9 1d.
at 613.

lien, the Internal Revenue Service obtained an injunction restraining
a domestic bank from transferring funds in the account of an alien
which were payable only at the bank's Montevideo branch. 1 0 The
court found no showing that the bank would be subjected to liability under Uruguayan law and rejected the argument that enforce11
ment of the injunction would hurt the bank's overseas business.
In the instant case the court expressed reluctance to hold
that the mere absence of criminal sanctions would necessarily require compliance with a subpoena. Recognizing that the vital
interests of a country may be expressed in ways other than the
enactment of criminal laws,12 the court said that such a rule would
show "scant regard for international comity. 113 To demonstrate
further the inadequacy of such a rule, the court noted the
absurdity of its effect: noncompliance might be excused in one
case because of an insignificant criminal penalty, 1 4 but compliance might be required in another case despite a much more
severe noncriminal penalty such as loss of the right to do
business. The court reasoned that in such cases it would be
unrealistic to let the decision turn on whether the sanction
was in fact criminal and to disregard all other factors. Accordingly, instead of terminating the inquiry with a finding that
the conduct ordered would not violate the criminal laws of a
foreign country, the court attempted to balance the national
interests of the United States and Germany while, at the same
time, considering what hardships, if any, the bank would suffer.
In so acting, the court followed section 40 of the Restatement
(Second), Foreign Relations. 1 5 Applying the standards suggested
1 0 United

States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1964).
llId. at 384, 402.
1 2 The court felt that the statements and directives of the
various organs of a government also indicated a nation's vital
396 F.2d at 902.
interests.
1 3 id.
147Te court referred to Application of Chase Manhattan Bank,
supra, where a subpoena was modified because complianze would have
resulted in a violation of Panamanian law punishable by a fine
In the opinion of the court, it would have
equivalent to $100.
been a "gross fiction" to contend that revocation of the bank's
license would be less disastrous than having to pay in insignificant fine merely because revocation is theoretically not a criminal
Id.
sanction.
1 5 Section

40 states:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require
inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state

by the Restatement, the court observed that United States antitrust laws were essential elements of the nation's economic
policies and that the evidence indicated that bank secrecy was
not an element of overriding importance in German national policy.
Therefore, the court concluded, the German laws would not excuse
the refusal to produce evidence necessary for the enforcement of
United States antitrust laws. In support of its conclusion, the
court noted that neither the State Department nor the German
government had expressed any view that enforcement of the subpoena would violate German public policy or embarrass GermanAmerican relations. 1 6 The court further observed that the protection of foreign economic interests of the United States from
injustice under foreign law must be left to the executive branch
of the government - the moving party in this case. In deciding
the case as it did, the court seemed to be influenced by the banks
apparent lack of good faith 1 7 and the fact that First National
City appeared to have a valid defense to any subsequent civil
suit under German law.

is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in
light of such factors as
(a) vital interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that
inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take
place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either
state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with
the rule prescribed by the state.
1 6 The opinion cited
In re Grand Jury Investigation of the
Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298, 318 (D.C. 1960), where the
Phillipine National Lines moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum
on grounds that it was an instrumentality of the Phillipine
government which did not wish to waive sovereign immunity to suit
or process. The court stated that it would reserve its views
pending a showing by the United States that the activities were
of a non-governmental nature. In upholding the subpoenas issued
to other shippers, the court noted, nevertheless, that it was required to give great consideration to the objectives of the
various foreign governments involved,
See also In Re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 FoR.Do
280 (D.C. 1952), where a subpoena duces tecum issued to an oil
company in which the British government had a 35% interest was
quashed on grounds of sovereign immunity after diplomatic intervention.
1 7 The court felt that the
bank had shown lack of good faith by
failing to make a simple inquiry into the nature or extent of the

The result reached in the present case is consistent with
the results of prior cases. The approach taken by the court,
however, differs from those of previous decisions. Here the
court indicated that there might be circumstances in which civil
penalties or liabilities, by themselves, would provide adequate
justification for disobeying a subpoena, while in prior cases
the only consideration had been whether criminal penalties were
involved. The former rule was an impractical and unjust means
of determining whether compliance with a subpoena should be re18
quired since criminal penalties may in some cases be insignificant,
while civil penalties may be extremely harsh. This approach failed
to recognize that domestic policy considerations may sometimes
outweigh the respect which ought to be accorded to the laws of a
friendly foreign sovereign. Moreover, such a rule in some
instances fostered the evasion of United States lawso 1 9 In contrast the Restatement recognizes that a state having jurisdiction
to prescribe and enforce rules of conduct should not be precluded
from exercising that jurisdiction solely because such rules will
require persons to violate the laws of another state also having
jurisdiction.2 0 In such cases of concurrent jurisdiction and conflicting laws, the Restatement dictates emphasis of the facts of
each case to determine whether the burden of compliance should
remain on the witness. 2 1 Among the factors to be considered are:
whether the foreign prescription is related to a legitimate
interest of the foreign nation; the public interest of the country
which would be served by the production of the documents; the
severity of the criminal or civil liability to which the adressee
of the subpoena might be subjected; the nationality of the witness;

records available at its Frankfurt branch and by not separating
those records which reflected the banks own work product0
396
F.2d at 905, n. 15.
1 8 See
note 11, supra.
1 9 In this regard one court remarked:
Without impugning in the slightest the widespread
legitimate use of foreign bank accounts, it is appropriate
to observe that the supposed immunity of funds in such
accounts and related information from American judicial
process is sometimes considered an attraction by those who
would evade taxes, conceal the ownership of assets, secrete
illicitly obtained money, or engage in banned international
trade. Matter of Equitable Plan Co'., 185 F. Suppo 57, 60 n. 2
(SoD.N.Y.

1960).

2 0 RtSTATEMENT

(SECOND),
STATES § 37 (1965).
2Ido § 40.

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

and whether the witness has demonstrated good faith. The application of the Restatement by the court in the instant case thus
indicates that in the future the imposition of criminal sanctions
by a foreign country will not necessarily justify noncompliance
with a subpoena while, on the other hand, there may be circumstances in which civil penalties alone will be sufficient to
excuse noncompliance.
J. v. K.

RELEASE OF AMERICAN SERVICEMAN TO FOREIGN COURT FOR TRIAL
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS WHERE SUBSTANTIAL
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES ARE
PROVIDED BY FOREIGN COURT

Petitioner, an American soldier stationed in Korea, was

charged by the Korean government with the murder of one of its
nationals. The Korean government claimed primary jurisdiction
over petitioner under the United States-Republic of Korea Status
of Forces Agreement of 1966.1 While trial was pending in a
Korean court, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from a
federal district court. 2 Petitioner contended that his delivery
to the Korean court would be unconstitutional because the fair
trial guarantees of the Agreement did not protect his fourteenth
amendment due process rights, and that the United States-Republic
of Korea Status of Forces Agreement was not approved by the United
States in a constitutionally acceptable manner. The court held,
petition dismissed. The transfer of petitioner would not be a
deprivation of due process rights since the Status of Forces
Agreement provides adequate constitutional protection for United
States servicemen prosecuted in Korean courts; and, since Korea
had exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses within its territory
under international law, the Status of Forces Agreement constituted
a unilateral waiver by Korea of its criminal jurisdiction so that
ratification by the United States was unnecessary to give effect
to the agreement. Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968).
The rules concerning jurisdiction over foreign troops,
absent a treaty or an executive agreement, developed tangentially
from The Schooner Exchange v, McFaddon,3 which involved a libel
against a ship owned originally by the libellant, seized by the
French, and subsequently docked in Philadelphia. The United
States Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, held that the
ship entered the United States under an implied exemption from
territorial jurisdiction. The Court said that although the
sovereign nation has absolute territorial jurisdiction, such
jurisdiction may be expressly or impliedly waived. In dictum
Marshall pointed out that in addition to the immunity of a friendly
man-of-war from jurisdiction, there is immunity as to foreign troops
in passage through a sovereign's territory with its consent. This
5
4
dictum was expanded in Coleman v. Tennessee and Dow v. Johnson
1 july 9, 1966, 17 UoSTo 1677, T.I.AoSo No. 6127.
2 At

a later date, petitioner filed a motion for a restraining
order to prevent respondent, Secretary of Defense, from releasing
him to the Korean authorities. The motion was denied, but on
appeal it was granted to the extent of precluding his transfer
pending the outcome of this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (DoD.Co 1968).
311 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
497 U.S. 509 (1878).'
5100 U.S. 158 (1879).

to include exemption of armed forces from the territorial jurisdiction
of the country in which they were stationed. 6 In Kinsella v. Krueger, 7
however, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Schooner Exchange,8 Coleman 9 and Dow 1 0 cases. In Kinsella, the Court recognized
that under international law each nation has jurisdiction over all
offenses committed within its territory and that exemptions arise
1 1 In Cozart v. Wilson 1 2
only by an agreement between the sovereigns.
13
it was noted that the dicta of Schooner Exchange regarding immunity
of armed forces is now entitled to no weight under Kinsella v. Krueger.
Most legal scholars recognize a rule of international law
granting foreign forces immunity from jurisdiction, 1 4 but they suggest enough exceptions in fact to negate its effect. For example,
the existence of a state of belligerency may be cruciall 5 as there
is greater likelihood of finding exclusive jurisdiction in the visiting
force if there is a war. 1 6 The receiving state is more likely to have
exclusive jurisdiction if a crime is committed by an individual rather
than by a body of troops, 1 7 or if the crime is committed by a serviceman while off-duty rather than in the line of duty.1 8 Another situation in which the host state has jurisdiction is when foreign troops
are stationed in that state rather than just passing through its
domain. 1 9
Although there is general recognition that some immunity for
foreign forces does exist, this immunity is usually established
6 Re,

The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law,
50 NW. U. L. REV. 349, 369 (1955). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 57, Reporters' Notes
at 178 (1965).
7351 U.S. 470 (1956).

811 U.S.

(7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

997 U.S. 509 (1878).
10100 U.S. 158 (1879).

llKinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 479 (1956).
12236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1956), See Note, Criminal Jurisdiction
Qver American Forces, 70 HARVo L. REV, 1043, 1047 (1957) (hereinafter
cited as Criminal Jurisdiction).
13351 U.S. 470 (1956).
141 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
§ 247 (2d ed. 1947); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 443 (8th
ed. 1955); 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 169 (1941);
King, Jurisdiction over Friendly Armed Forces, 36 AM. J. INT'L L.
539

(1942).
151 G. HYDE, supra note 14, at § 249; Schwartz, International Law
and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 53 COLUM. L. REV, 1091 (1953);
Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 1050. See also Bennett v.

Davis, 267 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1959).
16 This argument has been used to distinguish the Coleman and Dow
cases in which the causes of action arose during occupation of the
South in the Civil War,
1 7 Schwartz, supra
note 15, at 1105.
1 8 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S
0 524 (1957); May v. Wilson, 153 F. Supp.
668

(DoDoC.

1956); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 14, at 1098; Criminal

Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 1050.
19 Re, supra note 6, at 392; Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1105.
70

by agreements between sovereigns, and it is the territorial
sovereign who determines to what extent jurisdiction will be
waived. The United States, for instance, has formal agreements
20
with the friendly nations in which American troops are stationed.
Under these agreements, when an offense is solely in violation of
one state's laws and not of the other's, the former has exclusive
jurisdiction. If the offense violates the laws of both states,
this gives rise to concurrent jurisdiction. The receiving nation,
however, retains the primary right as to all offenses, other than
those against the property or security of the visiting state or
21
solely against a person of that state and his property.
It is clear that Americans abroad have no specific constitutional rights in the foreign state's courts, and absent a
treaty or executive agreement they can argue only a denial of
justice in the sense of discriminatory application of foreign
laws. 2 2 But the extent to which American troops stationed abroad
may be turned over for trial to a state not observing American
23
standards of due process is not clear. In Wilson v. Girard,
the Supreme Court found that the transfer of a serviceman to
Japanese custody for a crime committed in Japan did not violate
any constitutional or statutory provision, since the transfer
by the United States was no more than a waiver by the United
24
States of the qualified jurisdiction granted to by the Japanese.
Fortunately, however, under treaties between the United States
and friendly foreign nations in which American troops are stationed, the servicemen are provided safeguards substantially
similar to those guaranteed by the Constitution
For example,
in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement visiting servicemen are
assured: the right to a prompt and speedy trial, to be informed
of the charge against them, to be confronted by witnesses, to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in their favor,
to have legal representation of their own choice or free legal
assistance, to have the services of an interpreter if necessary,
and to have a representative of their government present at the
25
trial.
In the instant case, the court found that, under applicable
principles of international law, Korea should have exclusive
2 0 For

example: (multilateral)NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
June 19, 1951, 4 U.SoT. 1792, ToIoA.S. No. 2846; (bilateral)
Amendment of Article 16 of the Administrative Agreement under
Article 3 of the Security Treaty between the United States and
Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 1846, ToI.A.S. No. 2848.
2 1 1f the state
having primary jurisdiction does not exercise
its right, the other state may exercise its secondary right,
and in any case of particular importance, the state with the
primary right may waive jurisdiction in favor of the other state.
221 C. HYDE, supra note 14, at § 219.
23354 U.S. 524 (1957).
2 4 1d. at 530.
2 53ATO Status of Forces Agreement, supra note 20, at Art. VII,
§ 9.

jurisdiction to punish offenses committed within its territory
unless it consents to surrender its jurisdiction. For this
reason, the court concluded that the Status of Forces Agreement
constituted a unilateral waiver by Korea of its criminal jurisdiction so that ratification by the Uiited States Senate was
unnecessary to give effect to the agreement. The court also
found that the Status of Forces Agreement provided for American
servicemen tried in Korean courts rights substantially similar
to United States constitutional safeguards. Balancing the
possibility of deprivation of individual rights against the
national interest in stationing troops abroad, the court concluded that the national interest outweighed any other considerations.
This case restates the rule of Girard 2 6 to the effect that
international law requires that unless impliedly or expressly
waived, the jurisdiction over friendly foreign forces belongs
to the terkitorial sovereign in which the troops are stationed.
The instant case also points out that American servicemen
stationed abroad have no enforceable rights under the United
States Constitution when they are tried in a foreign court.
This is so because the United States cannot dictate to another
state the procedures to be followed in its courts. The Girard
case and the instant case also seem to indicate that transfer
of an American serviceman from United States custody to a
foreign court for trial does not violate any constitutional
rights of the serviceman. This result is not unduly harsh or
unreasonable so long as the foreign court provides the serviceman with rights substnatially similar to United States constitutional rights. But if the serviceman is transferred to the
custody of a foreign court which does not provide such rights,
the result does seem unduly harsh and unreasonable - particularly
in light of the fact that the serviceman's presence in the
foreign country may have been without his consent, In such a
situation, a federal court should decline to transfer the
serviceman to the foreign court. This result could be justified
under the well-recognized nationality theory of jurisdiction
which permits nations to prosecute its nationals for crimes
wherever committed.

W. E. H.

26354 U.S. 524 (1957).

PATRONS

Dr. Fred M. Medeweff
Mrs. Marjorie King Briggs
Mr. and Mrs. Norman D. Chadwick
Mr. Nelson V. Henry
Mr. and Mrs. Leslie D. Ball
Mr. and Mrs. G. Scott Briggs

